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Illusion - Is Seeing Really Believing?
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Illusion - Is Seeing Really Believing (1998)(Marshall Media)[Mac-PC].iso
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00035_Text_ref02t.txt
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1997-02-04
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Suppose, for example, you
are looking at a black object in
bright sunlight. How can you
identify its color? Despite the
fact that the object reflects only
a small proportion of the light it
receives, a great deal of light
falls on it. The sensation
produced by the black object
would thus be one of high
intensity. However, cues from
the surrounding scene, whose
significance you would have
learned from experience,
would also tell you that the
object is in bright light. You
therefore take those cues into
account and interpret the
sensation as standing for a dark
surface color.
THE GESTALT PERSPECTIVE An
entirely different theoretical
perspective on the problem of
perception has come down to us
from René Descartes in the
seventeenth century and
Immanuel Kant more than a
century later. Descartes held
that mind was far from the
tabula rasa that the British
empiricists described, but
rather possessed innate ideas
about form, size, and other
properties of objects. Kant
explicitly took issue with the
empiricist view that "there is
no conception in man's mind
which hath not at first ... been
begotten upon the organs of
sense," as Hobbes had written
in the previous century.
Instead, he argued that the
mind imposes its own internal
conception of space and time
upon the sensory information
it receives. If we did not have an
innate predisposition to localize
things in separate spatial
positions and to order events
successively in time, then how
could we profit at all from
sensory experience?